Print List
| Summary |
|---|
| Study and models of medical device development process |
| Strategic risk analysis with application to nuclear nonproliferation problems |
| Risk analysis and game theory: policy and management applications |
| Designing early warning systems for crisis situations |
|
Summary:
Study and models of medical device development process
Description:
The key objective of this study is to present a comprehensive description of the medical device development process of medical devices. Future policy-making could benefit significantly from a detailed understanding of the way medical devices are invented, developed, tested, used, and
gradually improved. A current need, for instance, is to accelerate the approval process, especially for complex devices. This includes, for example, exploring alternatives to the use of classical statistics, and the possibility of using Bayesian probability, to improve device review and surveillance.
Summary:
Strategic risk analysis with application to nuclear nonproliferation problems
Description:
This project centers on the application of risk and decision analysis to strategic issues. The illustration is nuclear non proliferation, and the quantitative analysis of US strategic options based on systems analyis and probability.
Summary:
Risk analysis and game theory: policy and management applications
Description:
This project is based on the combination of probabilistic risk analysis in a complex system (e.g., an engineered system) and game analysis between two parties. One application is based on a principal-agent model with application to the management of a complex system development where constraints can lead to shortcuts and decreased system capacity. The other application is an alternate game between insurgents and a government trying to allocate its resources between short-term protection and long-term solution to fundamental problems.
Summary:
Designing early warning systems for crisis situations
Description:
The objective of this study is to improve existing models of adversarial, strategic decision making in crises in two ways. Our first goal is to advance the theory of adversarial decision making by incorporating a moving time-horizon into dynamic signaling games with incomplete information. Our second goal is to create a model which removes the barriers currently standing in the way of the intelligence community’s adoption of Bayesian methods.
|